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ABSTRACT
The issue of audit fees and non-audit fees charged by the audit firms has been
discussed regularly in accounting and auditing literature. Recently, due to
the corporate scandals in United States, the issue is discussed together with a
host of revelations about audit failures that led to the companies’ demise. The
auditing profession is being badly blamed and some suggest that this could be
due to the audit firm’s reliance more on non-audit services rather than the
audit itself. Therefore, this study attempts to probe the situation in Malaysia
using the banking sector as the subject of interest. Specifically, it tries to
examine the impact of non-audit services conducted by audit firms to these
banks on audit fees. The results showed that the variable of non-audit fees is
statistically significant in determining audit fees as predicted. Further
sensitivity analysis showed that the results are robust to different
measurements and company size.
Keywords: Audit fees; non-audit fees; banking sector.
ABSTRAK
Isu yuran audit dan yuran bukan audit yang dikenakan oleh firma audit kerap
dibincangkan dalam bidang perakaunan dan pengauditan. Baru-baru ini,
disebabkan oleh skandal korporat di Amerika Syarikat, terutamanya skandal
Enron, isu ini diperdebatkan bersama dengan kegagalan pengauditan yang
dikatakan sebagai penyebab kepada kehancuran syarikat tersebut. Profesion
pengauditan telah dipersalahkan dengan teruknya dan ada yang menyatakan
bahawa ini disebabkan firma audit lebih bergantung kepada perkhidmatan
bukan audit dibandingkan pengauditan itu sendiri. Oleh itu, kajian ini
berusaha untuk mengkaji situasi di Malaysia dengan menggunakan sektor
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perbankan sebagai tumpuan kajian.  Secara spesifik, kajian ini cuba untuk
mengenal pasti kesan perkhidmatan bukan audit yang dijalankan oleh firma
audit di bank ini ke atas yuran audit. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa
pemboleh ubah yuran bukan audit secara statistiknya memberi kesan yang
signifikan ke atas yuran audit.  Selanjutnya dalam analisis sensitiviti didapati
bahawa dapatan kajian adalah konsisten bagi pengukuran dan saiz syarikat
yang berbeza.
Kata kunci: Yuran audit; yuran bukan audit; sektor perbankan.
INTRODUCTION
Research on non-audit fees is becoming important given its potential
effect on audit independence (Firth, 1997a). Recently, the Enron scandal
in the United States had bristled with a host of revelations about the
auditing, which led to its demise. Arthur Andersen, the auditor of Enron
was heavily criticised for the collapse, as it was alleged that they
concentrated more on non-audit services (here after, NAS) rather than
the audit itself. In 1998, Arthur Andersen’s total worldwide revenue
for NAS was US$ 3216.8 million as compared with US$ 2,876.6 million
only for audit services (Arthur Andersen, 1998).1   The total worldwide
revenue had grown by about 13 %t annually since 1990. One of the
reasons given by them was the growth in new services they provided
other than audit services.
In the United States, the challenge faced by the audit firms nowadays
is the increasing reluctance of their clients to purchase both consulting
and audit services from the same firms (The Star, 2002, February 7). In
addition, they have to deal with an onslaught of new laws heaped on
them by regulators, which among other things, discourage them from
selling NAS to the clients they audit. Auditors have also been criticised
by the public in the Enron scandal because of the lack of independence
in auditing their clients due to its long tenure. For that reason, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has requisitioned all banks
incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years
under a revised ruling. The new audit requirement is one of a series of
control measures on corporate governance introduced by the
Singaporean authorities (The Star, 2002, March 14). In Malaysia,
however, there is no regulation for the banks to change the audit firms
within a certain period.
Auditors are agents of the shareholders whose interests are considered
different to those of the managers of the companies audited (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). That is why there was a suggestion for the disclosurew
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of non-audit fees in published accounts in Malaysia to protect
shareholders’ interests (Teoh & Lim, 1996).  It is one of the tools to
minimise agency cost between managers and shareholders. Many
British Commonwealth countries have made it a requirement that audit
fees of listed companies be disclosed, and in Australia and the UK,
consultancy fees paid to the auditor for non-audit work must also be
published in the annual report (Firth, 1997a).
The purpose of this paper is to add to the empirical literature on audit
pricing by examining audit fees and non-audit fees paid to audit firms
in the banking sector in Malaysia. This study investigates the banking
sector because most of the studies in audit pricing exclude this sector
(Fields, Fraser & Wilkins, 2004).  Whilst there are studies that
investigated the perception of the shareholders, managers and auditors
of the effect of NAS fees on auditor independence (Gul & Teoh, 1986;
Teoh & Lim, 1996), none has specifically examined the relationship
between NAS fees and audit fees.  This relationship needs to be
examined because it was alleged that this resulted in auditors
compromising their independence in order to protect the lucrative NAS
income.  The audit firms would charge lower audit fees to retain their
clients and then charge higher fees on NAS fees to recover the loss,
thus it would affect the auditor independence (Hillison & Kennelley,
1988).  In fact, this is one of the factors that was raised by the regulator
in the United States and a new rule was introduced to protect the
independence of the auditors by restricting the NAS fees as reflected
in the Sarbanes- Oxley Act.
Background of Banking Sector
In Malaysia, a “bank” means an establishment that is engaged, among
others, in the business of receiving deposits on current accounts, deposit
accounts, savings accounts or other similar accounts, and paying or
collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers.2  The banking
sector plays a very important role in the development of the Malaysian
economy, since a strong banking sector is a prerequisite for sustainable
economic growth. This sector is given a lot of incentives in taking part
in the development of the economy. However, due to the economic
crisis that began in the third quarter of 1997, the government has
instructed that only ten anchor banks are to be established in the
ensuing years.3  The consolidation of domestic banking institutions into
ten banking groups was supposed to strengthen the nation’s banking
sector.
The banking sector is highly regulated and most of the local banks,
especially commercial banks are listed on the Main Board of the Bursaw
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Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or KLSE
before 2004). All banks operating in Malaysia, either local or foreign,
are governed by the Central Bank of Malaysia. All banks also have to
comply with the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) of
1989 to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, they have to
comply with the Company Act of 1965 and have to submit annual
reports to the Registrar of Companies and Bursa Malaysia.
Background of Non-Audit Services (NAS)  in Malaysia
In general, audit firms provide NAS such as tax consultancy, systems
consultancy, management advice, international business advice, human
resources management, and financial and investment consultancies
(Firth, 1997a). In addition, in the banking sector, they provide due
diligence and restructuring consultation necessitated by mergers or
acquisitions.
Teoh and Lim (1996) in their interview of senior partners from two of
the Big Six firms have found that consultancy fees made up 20% to
30% of their total revenues and the trend is likely to be on the increase.
In 1990, then President of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Haji
Hanifah Noordin, mentioned the need to control and monitor the NAS
performed by auditors (Hanifah, 1990). After the Enron scandal in the
United States, the issue of NAS is given much attention by the
regulators as well as by commentators from the accounting profession.
This issue had directly affected the accounting profession in Malaysia
as well.
Previously, the regulators do not stress on the disclosure of NAS fees.
This is in contrast to the amount paid as audit fees, which must be
disclosed in the annual reports as required by the Company Act of
1965. However, the recent amendment to the Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirement Regarding Transparency, which came into force in 2001,
has required all listed companies to disclose the amount of non-audit
fees paid to external auditors in their annual reports. The effective date
to the disclosure of non-audit fees in annual report was 1 June 2001.
However, this new requirement, with respect non-audit fees, does not
specify the manner of the disclosure (Refer to Chapter 9 under
Paragraph 9.25 of Appendix 9c in Part A number 17 of the  Bursa
Malaysia Listing Requirement).
The Objective of the Study
Only two Malaysian studies had examined the relationship between
non-audit fees and audit fees (Mohd Atef & Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib, 2001),w
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while other studies (see Gul & Teoh, 1986; Teoh & Lim, 1996) are
concerned about the perception of the stakeholders regarding the NAS
fees issue. However, Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000) and Ayoib (2001)
had not found significant relationships between NAS fees and audit
fees.  This might be due to the fact that their studies did not specifically
examine NAS fees and the voluntary disclosure requirement of NAS
fees in Bursa Malaysia listed companies.  Thus, the objective of this
study is to examine NAS and its relationships with audit fees in the
banking sector using archived data.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The next section
highlights the motivation of the study while Section 3 discusses relevant
literature on audit fees. Section 4 provides the theoretical rationale and
develops the hypothesis. Section 5 describes the research design and
sample selection. Section 6 reports and discusses the results and finally,
Section 7 concludes the research and provides implications and
limitations of the study.
THE MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY
The most important factor that motivated this study is the recent
corporate scandals in the developed countries in which the audit
profession is heavily criticised by the public. The public has accused
the auditors of lacking of independence, given by the fact that auditors
provided services other than audits to their clients. This gives rise to a
controversial issue whether an auditor should provide NAS to their
audit clients (Firth, 2002).  The argument is that the auditor is likely to
give bias judgment since the auditor is also the consultant of their audit
clients (Hillison & Kennelley, 1988).   In Malaysia, the Malaysian
Institute of Accountants (MIA) has issued guidelines with respect to
this matter (Malaysian Institute of Accountants by Laws, 2002a).  Other
studies have revealed that non-audit fees positively and significantly
determined audit fees but these studies are conducted in foreign
settings (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986a; Firth, 1997a, 1997b). Moreover,
the results in those studies were not consistent with the theory of
negative relationships between NAS fees and audit fees.
In the present study, we examine this issue in the local setting namely
Malaysian banks. To date, very few empirical studies in Malaysia have
examined the effect of NAS fees on audit fees except for a couple of
studies as previously mentioned (Mohd Atef & Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib,
2001). However, these prior studies did not specifically focus on non-
audit fees. Instead, they used non-audit fees only as one of the control
variables in the audit fee model, where the amounts that were notw
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disclosed in the annual reports were also included in the analysis. This
results in an inaccurate analysis on non-audit fees because some
companies had voluntary disclosed the NAS fees while others did not.4
For the present study, we do not treat the amount of non-audit fees
that are not disclosed in the annual reports as zero. Instead, these
amounts were obtained directly from the respective banks.
This study is expected to provide a better understanding about the
relationships between NAS fees and audit fees in Malaysia.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a number of previous studies addressing the issue of audit
fees and determinants of audit fees including non-audit fees. Previous
researchers used various settings in investigating determinants of audit
fees (Firth, 1997a). Simunic (1980) began the studies on audit fees by
developing a model that includes factors representing client size,
complexities and risks, which explains for the variation in audit fees.
In the regression analysis, it was found that auditee size, complexity
and risk were related to audit fees. In addition, no relationships existed
between audit fees and the Big Eight auditors in both large and small
audit markets.  In other words, the Big Eight auditors did not charge
higher audit fees than Non-Big Eight auditors in both markets.  Later,
similar studies were undertaken in countries such as the United
Kingdom (Chan, Ezamel, & Gwilliam, 1993; Pong & Whittington, 1994)
and Australia (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Craswell, Taylor &
Francis, 1995).  These studies found that auditee size, complexity and
risk are the robust determinants of audit fees.  These studies used
archival data and regression analyses were employed. However most
of them excluded the finance companies especially the banks despite
their importance to the economy.   This might be due to the fact that
the banks are the highly regulated companies and very different from
other types of companies.
Factors Affecting Audit Fee
The following section discusses factors affecting audit fee as examined
in previous studies.  The relationship between NAS fee and audit fee
is discussed in the last section before the hypothesis development.
Auditee Size
The most determinant factor of audit fees is the auditee size, which is
usually measured by total assets. In addition, Pong and Whittingtonw
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(1994) also found that the total sales are relevant to measure audit fees.
The size of auditee has a direct impact on the auditors’ work and
numerous studies have asserted a positive relationship between audit
fees and auditee size (Firth, 1985; Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Low,
Tan & Koh, 1990; Chan et al., 1993; Pong & Whittington, 1994; and
Gerrard, Houghton & Woodliff, 1994).
Similarly, studies by Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000) and Ayoib (2001) in
Malaysia have also found positive and significant relationships
between auditee size and audit fees. Auditors would invariably need
more time to audit larger companies therefore charge more audit fees
on such companies. They used the Bursa Malaysia listed companies’
annual reports from 1993 to 1995 and analysed the data using
Generalised Least Squares and Ordinary Least Squares. Both studies
had used data before the financial crisis in 1997.
Complexity
The complexity of the auditee also influences the audit fees in that the
auditors need longer time and more man power to complete their audits
(Firth, 1985; Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Simon, 1985; Low et al., 1990;
Chan et al., 1993; Pong & Whittington, 1994; Gerrard et al., 1994; Firth,
1997a; Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Mohd Atef & Ayoib, 2000).
Therefore, just as the auditee size, auditee complexity also bears a
positive relationship with the audit fees. Normally two proxies are
used; firstly the proportion of inventory and total receivables to total
assets and secondly, the number of subsidiaries are used for
measurement of audit complexity. For that reason, the present study
also uses both proxies in the determination of complexity.
Furthermore, long-term trend analysis has also been done on audit
fees. Menon and William (2001) analysed long-term trend of audit fees
and found that complexity (which was proxied by total receivables to
total assets and number of subsidiaries) had been significantly positive
to audit fees. They analysed the trends in audit fees from 1980 through
1997, adjusting for changes in client size, complexity, and risk in US.
They modified the Simon and Francis (1988) model in their analyses.
Sample of companies were from the voluntarily disclosed audit fees
data in SEC filings, chiefly the proxy statements.5
Audit Risks
Audit risks also have a significantly positive relationship with audit
fees due to the fact that the auditors need to do more work to eliminatew
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any potential litigation against the auditors. Palmrose (1986a), Francis
and Simon (1987) and Houghton and Jubb (1999) found that the
auditor’s opinion as a proxy of audit risks has a positive effect on the
audit fees.   Palmrose analysed the association between audit risks
and audit fees in the United States corporations, while Francis and
Simon  examined a small United States corporations, and Houghton
and Jubb investigated Western Australia companies. They all used data
from annual reports and found a positive relationship between audit
risks and audit fees.
Auditor Size/Industry Specialisation
Similarly, for auditor size, the Big Five auditors always charged more
than non-Big Five due to several reasons such as the brand name
achieved by the Big Five and higher audit quality (Palmrose, 1986a;
Francis & Simon, 1987; Simon & Francis, 1988; Butterworth &
Houghton, 1995). The stiff competition between the auditors gives
opportunities for the Big Five auditors to gain higher quality work
because they have more strength and expertise than the non-Big Five.
Hence, the auditee has to pay a larger premium to the Big Five for the
higher audit quality (Firth, 1993).
Craswell and Taylor (1991) found evidence of industry specialisation
among Australian audit firms. This occurred when many contractual
influences such as reputation, similarities of client create a demand
for a specific set of skills, which enhances auditor competence. They
suggested that product differentiation among auditors represents a
significant part in explaining the market structure of auditing.
Therefore, audit quality is not based only on the brand name of the
auditors, which is defined by De Angelo (1981) as the ability to discover
a breach and  the independence to report the breach. However, it also
consists of multiple attributes such as audit specialisation to add the
value of audit quality. Craswell and Taylor used the audit fees data for
companies listed on Australian Stock Exchanges during the period 1982
to 1987. The study adopted two approaches related to some specified
absolute market share and relative to the share of other companies.
Further investigation by Craswell et al. (1995) using 1,484 Australian
public listed companies found that, on the average, the Big Eight
auditors which are industry specialists earn a 34% premium over non-
specialist Big Eight auditors, and the Big Eight brand name premium
over non-Big Eight auditors averaged around 30%.
Furthermore, Defond, Francis, and Wong (2000) indicated that there
were premiums for both general brand name and for industryw
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specialisation in the Big Six in Hong Kong. They examined the audit
fees for the year 1992 public listed companies (excluding the finance
industry) from data in annual reports using regression analyses.  The
results suggested that the Big Six brand name reputation is a necessary
foundation in which to achieve higher priced quality-differentiated
audits based on industry specialisation.
In Malaysia, the results showed that the Big Six audit firms acquire
more than 60% of the audit market of public listed companies and
none of them specialises in only one industry (Takiah, Ruhanita & Aini,
2000).  They utilised 10% of the total industry clients as a specialist as
suggested by Craswell and Taylor (1991) and Craswell et al. (1995).
Foreign Companies
Studies by Rose (1999) and Ayoib (2001) in the Malaysian market
showed that foreign companies were charged higher fees than local
firms. Rose investigated audit fee determinants in Malaysia and Hong
Kong. She used the audit fee models developed in prior literature such
as Simunic (1980). The models were analysed by means of Ordinary
Least Squares regression and run separately for each country. The
sample was collected from Worldscope Compact Disclosure, Moody’s
Companies International and the Lexis/Nexis database for the year 1995.
Similarly, Ayoib (2001) used the percentage of foreign ownership and
found the variable to be highly significant in explaining the variability
of audit fees.
Non-Audit Fees
It was argued that a negative relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees would happen due to the trade off between audit and NAS
works (Simunic, 1984). This stems from the knowledge spillover effects
whereby the benefits from the NAS may subsequently be passed on to
the companies by reducing the audit fees. Another explanation of this
negative relationship is that the audit is used as a loss leader to obtain
the more lucrative consultancy works.  The effect of loss leader reduces
the audit fees and subsequently audit firms increase the NAS fees to
capture the loss (Hillison & Kennelley, 1988). This would also occur if
audit firms expect to avoid a dismissal by reducing the audit fees and
then recoup the loss by increasing the NAS fees.  To our knowledge
the studies that only found a negative relationship between audit fees
and NAS fees were those by Clatworthy, Mellett and Peel (2002) and
Fields et al. (2004).  Clatworthy et al. (2002) investigated public sector
organisations in the United Kingdom while Fields et al. (2004) examined
banks in the United States.w
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Despite these theories, many empirical studies found that the non-
audit fees were positively and significantly related to the audit fees
(Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic, 1984; Ezzamel, Gwilliam & Holland, 1996;
Firth, 1997a, 1997b; 1999).  Similarly, Firth (2002) found that there is
positive association between consultancy fees and audit fees using the
United Kingdom sample. He used data from a sample of 314 UK quoted
companies and replicated his model in 1997a. He explained that this
might be due to specific events in the company that generate a demand
for consultancy services as well as requiring additional audit effort.
Examples of specific events are mergers and acquisitions, share issues,
implementation of new accounting and information systems,
appointment of new CEOs, and corporate restructures.
The study by Firth (2002) also proved that in the United Kingdom,
non-audit fees have rocketed over the past five years. Since 1997 they
have risen from Sterling £266 million to Sterling £636 million. At the
same time ordinary audit remuneration had gone up from Sterling
£186 million to Sterling £212 million (Cliff, 2002). This trend confirms
that clients are purchasing NAS at an increasing rate along with the
audit services.   This revealed that while the non-audit fees increased,
the audit fees also marginally increased, therefore a positive
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees would be observed.
The reason for positive relationship between audit fees and non-audit
fees might be due to the fact that the demand for auditing is highly
elastic (Beck, Frecka & Solomon, 1988).  Further explanation of this
phenomenon is that the cheaper per unit price of auditing resulting
from the joint provision of services (audit and non-audit services)
would lead clients to purchase a greater quantity of auditing such that
the overall total audit fees increases (Firth, 2002).  Another explanation
for the positive association is that NAS fees are proxying for size
attributes or organisational changes, which increase both audit and
NAS, where they are not well controlled in the audit fee model
(Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986b; Clatworthy et al., 2002).
In contrast, Butterworth and Houghton (1995) found no statistically
significant relationships between audit fees and non-audit fees in the
Australian market. They used cross sectional data in 1987 and 1988
and regressed the audit fees model using the Ordinary Least Squares
procedure.  The data came from a computerised database of annual
reports of 433 Western Australia-headquartered companies.   Similarly,
in Malaysia, Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000) and Ayoib (2001) also found
no statistically significant relationships between non-audit fees and
audit fees.w
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However, Teoh and Lim (1996) in their experimental Malaysian study
found that the audit committees, disclosure on non-audit fees and
rotation of audit firms would influence and impair audit independence.
Their subjects were 100 accountants from public accounting firms and
100 accountants from the industry, randomly selected from the
Membership Directory of the Malaysia Institute of Accountants. Their
results show that inadequate disclosure of non-audit fees, management
consultancy service fees in excess of 50% of total audit fees and retention
of auditors for over five years will reflect lower independence. A survey
done by Gul and Teoh (1986) in Malaysia suggested that non-audit
services reduce the public’s confidence in auditors’ independence. 73%
of the respondents indicated that expansions by audit firms into non-
audit services lessened the confidence in auditor’s independence.
Moreover the NAS fees also influence auditor opinion, subsequently
auditor independence is perceived to be impaired.   For example, Wines
(1994) investigated the link between audit qualification and non-audit
fees using the audit reports for a sample of public listed companies
over the period of 1980 to 1989 in Australia. The results of the analysis
indicated that the auditors of companies, which received clean reports
over the period, derived a significantly higher proportion of their
remuneration from non-audit services fees than the auditors of
companies receiving at least one audit qualification. These findings
suggest that auditors were less likely to give qualified reports to clients’
financial statements when high levels of non-audit services fees are
involved.  Furthermore, Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) revealed
a negative relationship between stock market reaction to the public
disclosure of non-audit fees. They suggested that it might be due to
investors’ belief that the provision of non-audit services compromises
the auditor independence.
In general, researchers found that, for non-finance listed companies,
there is a positive relationship between audit fees and NAS fees even
after controlling for client size (Firth, 2002).  However, recent studies
by Clatworthy et al. (2002) & Fields et al.  (2004) found a negative
association between audit fees and NAS fees of public sector and
finance institutions, respectively.  Both markets have unique
characteristics, very different when compared to non-finance listed
companies and rarely studied by auditing researchers (Firth, 1997a;
Clatworthy et al., 2002; and Fields et al., 2004).  A further study should
be done in other settings using the unique type of companies to provide
a rigorous result of the relationship between NAS fees and audit fees,
since prior studies are shown to have inconsistent results.  Hence the
present study is to address this issue by focusing on the relationshipw
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between the audit fees and non-audit fees in the Malaysian Banking
Sector.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Simunic (1984) argued that a negative relationship between audit fees
and non-audit fees would occur due to the trade off between audit
fees and non-audit fees as a consequence of the knowledge spillover
effects.  According to Clatworthy et al. (2002), knowledge spillover is:
Where the auditor also provides NAS fees, any
concomitant increase in client knowledge may ‘spill over’
from one service to another, leading to cost reductions,
which may be passed on to the audittee via lower audit
fees. (p. 1412)
Thus, the knowledge spillover effect results in costs saving. The
knowledge and skills acquired when doing consultancy services will
be used in auditing works resulting in cost and time savings.  In other
words, knowledge spillover benefits the audit clients by reducing total
costs which they have to bear because the total costs of one audit firm
which provides both audit and non audit services are less than the
total costs when both services are performed by separate audit firms.
Another explanation with respect to the negative relationship between
audit fees and NAS fees, is due to the loss leader effect. The increasing
competition in audit services makes the audit market less attractive
(Hillison & Kennelley, 1988). However, the NAS sector arguably has a
higher profit margin than audit services because of rapid growth in
the consulting industry worldwide (Hillison & Kennelley, 1988; Firth,
2002).  Hence, audit firms today view NAS as the better choice to
increase their revenue, have better prospects for their audit firm, and
growth opportunities.
Audit services may in fact be loss leaders used to get a foot in the door
in terms of offering NAS (Hillison & Kennelley, 1988).  In other words,
the audit firms would use the lower audit fees to retain their clients
and then charge higher fees on non-audit fees to recover the loss by
earning ‘excess’ returns from NAS (Firth, 1997a). Both theories of
knowledge spillover and loss leader effect would yield a negative
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees
Therefore, the derived hypothesis is as follows (in alternative form):w
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H0 = There is a significant negative relationship between audit fees
and  non-audit fees.
Other Factors
In addition to NAS, there are other factors that may influence audit
fees.  These factors have already been discussed in the literature review
earlier and also discussed in the research design section as part of the
development of the control variables in the model to be used to test
the hypothesis.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Sample and Data
The population of the study is all banks registered in Malaysia
identified from the “Bankers Directory 2000”.  The data was extracted
from the respective year 1999 annual reports and used for analysis.
1999 represents the year after the Asian economic crisis in mid 1997.6
The researchers personally visited the banks that did not disclose NAS
fees in the annual reports in order to obtain them.  Only ten banks
provided NAS fees data and banks without NAS fees data were omitted
from the analysis (see Table 1).  Thus, the final sample for this analysis
is 31 banks; 21 banks that had disclosed the non-audit fees in their
annual reports plus ten banks that provided the NAS fee data after
interviewing them.7
Note that sample sizes of around 30 to 500 are appropriate for most
research (Sekaran, 2000, p. 296). For the present study, the sample
represents 66% of the total banks in Malaysia.
Table 1
Sample Selection Summary
Sample Selection Characteristics Number Of Banks % Of Banks
Total banks in Malaysia in 1999
based on Bankers Directory 2000 47 100
and Bursa Malaysia listed banks
in the main board.
Number of banks that did not
disclose the non-audit fees. (16) (34)
Total final sample 31 66w
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Explanation of the Model
This study is replicated from the previous studies in audit fees (see,
Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Mohd Atef & Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib; 2001)
and extended to accommodate the Malaysian environment and in
particular the Malaysian banking sector. As mentioned before, we use
the Ordinary Least Squares to analyse the data.
The research model is as follows:
LOGFEE = β0 + β1LOGASSETS + β2SQSUBS + β3ARTA +
β4OPINION + β5AUDITOR + β6LOGNAS +β7FOREIGN + β8COM + e
The measurements of the variables are as follows:
Dependent Variable
LOGFEE = Natural log of total audit fees
Independent Variable
LOGNAS = Natural log of the non-audit
services fees
Independent Control Variables
LOGASSETS = Natural log of total assets
SQSUBS = Square root of the number of
consolidated subsidiaries
ARTA = Account receivables to total assets
(%)
OPINION = Indicator variable having a value
of 1 if the firm receives a “subject
to” audit opinion, or 0 if otherwise
AUDITOR = Indicator variable having a value
of 1 if the auditor is the Big Five
firm, or 0 if otherwise
FOREIGN = Indicator variable having a value
of 1 if the bank is a foreign bank,
or 0 if otherwise
COM = Indicator variable having a value
of 1 if the bank is a commercial
bank, or 0 if merchant bank
e = Error term assumed to be normally
distributed
βi = Regression Coefficientsw
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Explanation and Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variable
Audit Fee
Audit fee is the dependent variable. Under the Company Act of 1965,
the audit fee is required to be disclosed in the annual reports. It is
measured by the dollar value of audit fees paid by the bank to the
auditor. Logarithmic transformation is used for analysis due to the
fact that audit fees increase at a reducing rate with size.8
Independent Variable
Non-Audit Services Fees
This is the hypothesis variable. NAS fees charged to auditees are
measured by the dollar value of NAS paid to the auditor by the bank.
As mentioned before, it is not mandatory for Bursa Malaysia listed
companies to disclose the amount of NAS fees in annual reports prior
to the year 2001. Similar to audit fees, NAS fees are also transformed
to correct non-normality in the distribution of data.
Control Variables
Auditee Size
There are many of studies, which prove that auditee size has a
significant impact on the audit fees. In fact, it may be said that auditee
size has been found to be the most significant independent variable in
determining audit fees. In all studies of audit pricing, a positive
relationship has been discovered between audit fees and auditee size.
Total assets are used in the present study due to it being  consistent
before and after the 1997 crisis when compared to total revenues.9   In
addition, most of the previous studies used total assets to measure the
auditee size to be consistent with other studies, it is transformed to
logarithmic data. It is expected that a positive relationship between
this independent variable and audit fees will take place.
Complexity
Complexity of the auditees influences the auditors’ job due to more
time required to do the audit, i.e the more complex the banks are as a
whole, the higher the audit fees charged by the auditors. For the present
study, two variables are used as the proxy of the auditees’ complexityw
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– firstly, the number of subsidiaries measured by the square root of the
subsidiaries and secondly, the ratio of account receivables to total assets.
Two proxies are needed to measure the complexity due to differences
in measurement. Receivables are used instead of inventories because
of the distinct nature of banks, which do not generally have any
inventories (Rose, 1999). Specifically, in the present study, items of loan
and advances, which are measured within one year, are used for
receivables as the proxy of complexity.
Audit Opinion
Many studies have found that audit opinion has a significantly positive
relationship with the audit fees (Palmrose, 1986a; Francis & Simon,
1987; Houghton & Jubb, 1999). In the present study, this variable is a
proxy for audit risk and it is assumed that the sign for the relationship
between auditor opinion and audit fees is positive.
Auditor
Studies have shown a positive correlation between Big Five firms and
audit fees (Palmrose, 1986a; Francis & Simon, 1987) in the United States
market as well as in the Malaysian market (Rose, 1999;  Ayoib, 2001).
This is due to the reputation effect of the Big Five, where a positive
relationship between audit fees and auditor is expected.
Foreign
In Malaysia, two studies found that foreign companies were charged
higher audit fees than other firms (Rose, 1999; & Ayoib, 2001). Foreign
banks, which are multinational companies demand high levels of audit
quality to satisfy international investors and place more value on the
international reputations of the Big Six auditors than do domestic firms
(Rose, 1999). Therefore, it is predicted that foreign banks are positively
correlated with audit fees.
Commercial
This new variable is introduced because banks are categorised into
two types, which are commercial  and merchant banks. We argue that
commercial banks pay more audit fees than merchant banks with other
things being equal. There are three reasons for this, firstly, the
commercial banks in Malaysia have many branches, so the auditor
needs comparatively more time to audit the banks. Secondly the total
assets of the commercial banks are likely to be more than that of
merchant banks. However, this aspect is already controlled by the sizew
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measure in the model. Thirdly, the transactions taking place in the
commercial banks are likely to be more complex because it involves
companies as well as  individuals, while merchant banks usually deal
with companies only.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for the variables.10
Table 2
Summary of Descriptive Statistics (RM): 1999 (N=31)
Variables Mean Median Min. Max.
Audit fees 190,612 100,000 8,000 1,785,000
NAS fees 233,049 22,000 1,000 5,500,000
Assets 11,700,000,000 79,900,000,000 50,500,000,000 57,700,000.000
Subs 7.3 3 0 40
ARTA 0.37 0.39 0.02 0.71
Opiniona 0 0 0 0
Auditor 0.97 1 0 1
Foreign 0.32 0 0 1
Commercial 0.81 1 0 1
a  Cannot be computed because all banks in the sample received
unqualified audit opinion.
Variable Description
Audit fees - Total of audit fees
NAS fees - Total of non-audit services fees
Assets - Total assets
Subs - Number of subsidiaries
ARTA - Ratio of total receivables to total assets
Opinion - Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the firm
receive a  “subject to”   audit opinion and 0 otherwise
Auditor - Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the auditor is
the Big Five firm, and 0 otherwise
Foreign - Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the bank is the
foreign bank, and 0 otherwise
Commercial - Indicator variable having a value of 1 if the bank is the
Commercial bank, and 0 merchant banks.w
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The mean of total audit fees for the sample was RM190,612 as compared
with mean for NAS fees of RM233,049. For the  number of subsidiaries
and total receivables to total assets, the averages were 7.3 and 0.37,
respectively.
There are no banks that received qualified opinion.  All the banks were
audited by the Big-Five firms, except for the BSN Commercial Bank
Berhad, which hired Salleh, Leong, Azlan & Co. as its auditor.
The audit fees ranged from RM8,000 to RM1,785,000. However, the
non-audit fees ranged from RM1,000 to RM5,500,000. This shows that
the non-audit fees range is larger than audit fees, which means that
the NAS offered by the auditors are quite diverse depending on the
needs of the individual bankers. For OPINION, no computation had
been carried out because all the banks received unqualified opinion.
In addition, Pearson correlation coefficients (r) are also computed to
determine the correlation between the independent variables.
Correlations among the independent variables could possibly confound
interpretation of the regressions (Firth, 1997a). The results in Table 3
suggest that the largest absolute value is 0.668 between NAS and
ASSETS, with a significance level of 0.01. The high correlation is due
to the fact that large firms tend to have large monetary attributes, not
that there is direct causal relationship between the variables (Pong &
Whittington, 1994). Therefore, the Pearson correlation coefficients are
acceptable in all cases. Note that the omission of size variable did not
change the results. Furthermore, the largest Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) is 2.336 and the mean of all VIFs is 1.430. It shows that
multicollinearity does not pose a serious problem for the regression
analysis.11
Table 3
 Pearson’s Correlation among Independent Variables
Variables NAS ASSETS SUBS ARTA OPINION AUDITOR FOREIGN COM
NAS 1 0.668** 0.561** -0.102 a 0.039 -0.146 0.106
ASSETS 0.668** 1 0.644** -0.144 a 0.126 -0.212 0.207
SUBS 0.561** 0.644** 1 -0.153 a 0.101 -3.52* 0.133
ARTA -0.102 -0.144 -0.153 1 a 0.049 -0.014 0.099
OPINION a a a a a a a a
AUDITOR 0.039 0.126 0.101 0.049 a 1 0.126 0.373*
FOREIGN -0.146 -0.212 -0.352 -0.014 a 0.126 1 0.338*
COM 0.106 0.207 0.133 0.099 a 0.373* 0.338* 1
a. The OPINION variable is deleted from the analysis due to constant value
(i.e. all values are 0’s).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)w
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
In Table 4, the adjusted R2 for the audit fee model is 0.589 with the F
value of 7.151 and it is significant at p < 0.0001. This reveals that 58.9%
of the variance is significantly explained by the independent variables.
However, it was lower than other studies, such as the ones by Francis
and Simon (1987), Butterworth and Houghton (1995), Firth (1997a),
Mohd Atef and Ayoib (2000), and Ayoib (2001). This might be due to
the higher number of independent variables used by those studies,
and the fact that the present study only uses banks in the sample.
We also performed diagnostic tests related to two assumptions. The
tests were carried out to determine whether there is homoskedasticity
in the Ordinary Least Squares analysis12  and if autocorrelation is
present in the Ordinary Least Squares regression results.13   Two
analyses were employed, which are the Goldfield and Quandt analysis
for the detection of heteroscedasticity, and the Durbin-Watson Model.
The results showed that there are no heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation problems in the Ordinary Least Squares analysis.
Table 4
Summary of Ordinary Least Squares Regression for Audit Fees,
N = 31
Independent Predicted Coefficients t-statistics Significant
   Variables Signs (Beta)
LOGNAS - -0.255 -1.675        0.050**
LOGASSETS + 0.695 3.547        0.001****
SQSUBS + 0.311 1.822        0.040**
ARTA + 0.072 0.573        0.286
AUDITOR + 0.095        -0.737        0.235
FOREIGN + 0.274         1.813        0.042**
COM + 0.172         1.204        0.121
Constant +/-       -0.565        0.169
Adjusted R2 0.589
F- Ratio 7.151
Significant F 0.000b
Notes:
a. Dependent Variable: LOGFEE
b. Predictors: LOGNAS, LOGASSETS, SQSUBS, ARTA, AUDITOR,
FOREIGN, COM Constant. The OPINION variable is deleted from the
analysis due to constant value (i.e. all values are 0’s).
**** significant at 0.001 level (1-tailed)
**    significant at 0.05 level (1-tailed)w
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The result for LOGNAS is negative and significant at 0.05 levels.
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is supported, i.e  the audit fees
are negatively related to NAS fee.  This is consistent with the theories
regarding knowledge spillover and trade off between audit fees and
other fees (loss leader) as discussed earlier. Also, the results were not
sensitive to different measurements and sampling (for example by
excluding merger data).
Whilst there are two explanations for the negative relationship, it cannot
be ascertained as to which preposition might influence the results. If it
is due to the knowledge spillover effect, it may be concluded that the
performance of NAS by the auditors has led to cost saving. However,
if the negative relationship is caused by audit acting as a loss leader,
there would be much doubt as to the independence of the auditor in
conducting the audit.  It is suggested that future research look into
whether the relationship is due to the phenomenon of knowledge
spillover or that of the loss leader.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that has found a significant
negative relationship between audit and non-audit fees, similar to
Clatworthy et al. (2002) and Fields et al. (2004) but in Malaysian setting.
Moreover, this study is consistent with Fields et al. (2004), which shows
that the banking sector has unique characteristics as compared to non-
finance companies.
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The present study sought to look into the relationship between non-
audit fees and audit fees in the Malaysian banking sector.  Banks are
vital to the operation of emerging countries such as Malaysia, as
depository institutions and lenders to both companies and individuals.
This study is relevant because auditors are vitally important to the
Malaysian banking system. For example, Malaysian Approved
Auditing Standard (MASA) 1004 clearly stated that the role of external
auditors in banking sectors is to assure the integrity of the banks’
management, the fairness of financial statements and ultimately the
integrity of the financial markets.  The auditor’s opinion lends
credibility to financial statements and thereby assists in promoting
confidence in the banking system (Refer to MASA 1004, para, 1).
Therefore, auditor independence appears to be essential and a “prime
ingredient” for a healthy  banking sector.
 However, auditor independence might be compromised if the auditor
provided NAS to the banks.  This is because the auditors are paid otherw
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lucrative fees rather than the core audit service itself, hence conflicting
interest would be prevailed.  Subsequently, the auditors are not able to
provide strong, valid and reliable assurance to prudently monitor the
operation systems and procedures of the banks.   This would not only
have an adverse impact on the banking system but, also the Malaysian
economy as a whole.
In general, the study reveals that non-audit fees have a strong negative
relationship with audit fees. This is consistent with Fields et al.  (2004)
who also utilised the banking sector in their analysis. In fact, prior
studies found that the negative relationship between NAS fees and
audit fees only occurred in highly regulated, very important and unique
sectors compared to other types of companies such as non-finance
companies (Clatworthy et al., 2002; Fields et al., 2004). This negative
relationship might be due to either knowledge spillover effect or loss
leader effect.  If it is due to the knowledge spillover effect, it would
benefit the banks in which the auditors utilise the knowledge obtained
from the non-audit works in their audit works, which would result in
cost saving.  However, for the loss leader effect, the audit firms would
use the audit works as a loss leader to obtain a more lucrative
consultancy work. The effect reduces the audit fees and the auditors
captures the loss by increasing NAS fees (Hillison & Kenneley, 1988).
This would also occur if the audit firms would charge lower audit fees
to retain their clients and then charge higher fees on NAS to recover
the loss.  A low priced audit is used to entice companies to stay with
the auditor concerned, and the auditor recoups the losses incurred on
the audit fees by earning excess returns from NAS fees (Firth, 1997a).
The loss leader effect would affect auditor independence.
Some implications from these results should be of concern to policy
makers and researchers alike.  The results of this study can be used to
assist and give feedback to the policy makers and accounting bodies,
such as Bank Negara Malaysia, MIA and Malaysia Institute of Certified
Public Accountant (MICPA), to formulate rules and guidelines in order
to improve auditor independence in Malaysia. This is because the
revenue from NAS fees received by auditors is crucial to auditor
independence especially if the negative relationship between audit fees
and NAS fees is due to the loss leader effect, hence the excessive reliance
on NAS fees by the auditor should be emphasised to foster the
transparency of auditors.  Perhaps, some kind of restriction on NAS
fees might be necessary since it was found to have a significantly
negative association with the audit fees.14  For example, the regulators
should investigate NAS further, which might impair the auditor
independence especially in services, such as providing internal audit
services, and designing and implementing financial informationw
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systems for their audit clients. Moreover, the policy makers should
focus more closely on the NAS given by auditors especially if the NAS
is recurring every year (more than a single or one time NAS). Therefore,
the regulators should make it mandatory for banks to disclose the NAS
in the annual reports, even if the bank does not purchase NAS. In fact,
it is also recommended that the NAS fee is segregated between
recurring NAS and non-recurring NAS, because audit firms may be
taking advantage of increasing their income by hiking NAS fees and
reducing the audit fees. Future research should be carried out to
examine this issue further due to the two contending theories that
propose a negative relationship between audit fees and NAS fees as
discussed earlier. Whilst independence is in fact a state of mind of the
auditors, the recommendations by this paper might improve the
perceptions of users towards auditor independence.
.
Future research studying the relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees should also cover other sectors with the latest data and a
larger sample size, as well as cover a longer period of time. In addition,
other variables such as return on equity, debt ratio, specialisation of
the auditor should be included due to the lower explanatory power
found in the model. Finally, comparative studies between countries
could also be a good idea to compare the situation in Malaysia vis-à-
vis with other countries.
These findings are subjected to several limitations. Firstly, in terms of
generalisability, which is due to the small sample size, single-period
data and the focus on the banking sector, which might be different
from other sectors. Secondly, its low explanatory power as compared
to other studies shows that there are other factors that are not captured
by the model. Lastly, some of the banks, which did not disclose their
NAS fees in annual report, were reluctant to provide the NAS fees.
The results will be more complete if the data from all banks were
END NOTES
1 Malaysian Institute Accountant By Law (On Professional
Conduct and Ethics) (revised 2002), suggested that audit firms
should not accept any appointment if they provide non-audit
services, if the provision of non-audit services would create a
significant threat to the professional independence, integrity and
objectivity of the audit firms.
2 See Section 1 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act
(BAFIA) 1989 for a comprehensive definition of the bank.w
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3 Local banks were directed to merge before the end of 2000,
however up until 2002; there were still 11 anchor banks in
Malaysia.
4 For companies that not disclose NAS fees, both studies treated
the amount as zero in their analyses.  However, some of the
companies might purchase NAS but did not disclose it since it
was not required by the regulators to be disclosed in the annual
reports prior to 1 June 2001.
5 Proxy statements are disclosure statements of fees billed by
companies’ financial statement auditors. The disclosed fees are
reported in three categories: a) annual audit and quarterly
reviews; b) financial information systems design and
implementation; and c) all other services.
6 Malaysia was also involved in the economic crisis.  Previous
studies had used data before the crisis.
7 The merger data is included in the main analysis; however it is
excluded in the sensitivity analysis following Firth (2002) who
found that merger data influenced the significance of the results.
The results of the study were similar.
8 Most of the audit fees studies used the logarithmic
transformation in the model of audit fees (see for example,
Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Mohd Atef & Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib,
2001).
9 For example Affin Bank’s revenue fluctuated from 1996 to 2000
with RM322,721,000, RM414,032,000, RM290,844,000,
RM323,202,000, and RM168,480,000, respectively. However, total
assets appeared to be more consistent from 1996 to 2000 with
RM12,091,215,000, RM15,299,470,000, RM14,385,334,000,
RM15,011,699,000, and RM15,643,851,000, respectively.
10 We include the descriptive statistics in the analysis because other
studies in the audit fees and NAS fees also include the descriptive
statistics (see for example Firth, 1997a; & Firth, 2002).
11 Sekaran (2000) suggested that multicollinearity is destructive if
correlations between the independent variables are above 0.75.
In addition, the largest VIF is not greater than 10 and the mean
of all VIFs is not larger than 2 (Neter, Wasserman, & Krutner,
1991).
12 According to Lewis (1993), heteroskedasticity refers to the
situation in which contrary to the assumption of
homoscedasticity, the error term in a regression model does not
have constant variance.
13 Lewis (1993) stated that autocorrelation refers to a situation
whereby error terms associated with different observations are
correlated.w
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14 In a Colloquium on Corporate Governance on 23 April 2002,
one of the key issues discussed was auditor independence,
particularly the restrictions on the provision of non-audit
services and Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) had requested
Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) and Malaysia Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) to provide feedback
on that matter  (MIA, 2002b).
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